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ABSTRACT

Power in general theory is defined as having three forms: coercive, utilitarian, and normative. In international relations, emphasis is placed on the first two to the neglect of the third. In this paper, the term "diplomacy" is used for normative power in international relations. Diplomacy is related to three policy making stages and to five dimensions of power. The purpose is not empirical research or theory building but a better public understanding of foreign policy. Southern Africa in the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan is used as the principal case study. The document concludes with an 84-item bibliography. (Author/CFR)

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DIPLOMACY AS NATIONAL POWER: UNITED STATES POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

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Power in general theory is defined as having three forms: coercive, utilitarian and normative, yet in international relations most of the emphasis is put on the first, military power, and often the second, economic power, to the neglect of the third. In this paper the term diplomacy is used for normative power in international relations. Diplomacy is related to three policymaking stages and to five dimensions of power in order to isolate consensus as the element that contributes to the intangible power base of diplomacy, in contrast to physical elements that go into the bases of military and economic power. The purpose is not empirical research or theory-building but a better public understanding of foreign policy.

Southern Africa in the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan is used as the principal case study, in addition to other examples of diplomatic power that are mentioned more briefly. It is concluded that three sources of diplomatic power were important in US policies toward southern Africa, and South Africa in particular. Jimmy Carter flunked the three-way "why" test of consensus sources by not getting the cooperation of the white South Africans, while Ronald Reagan got grades that were barely passing, if that, for his loss of consensus with the American public and the Front Line states in Africa.

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DIPLOMACY AS NATIONAL POWER:
UNITED STATES POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA

Apartheid and regional problems in southern Africa have been prominent issues of US foreign policy since 1985, as they were throughout the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. This paper undertakes to use one similarity between the Carter and Reagan policies as a case study with broader implications for diplomacy as national power.

Policies of the two presidents differed sharply in styles and methods, though not so much in goals and content. The parallel between them is that both presidents relied on diplomacy for four years in each case, almost to the exclusion of other tools of foreign policy. But the purpose here is to look more at policy ends than at means alone, and particularly at the assets that appear to contribute to the power base of diplomacy. These assets are intangible and therefore quite different from the physical assets that comprise the main supports of military and economic power.

An equally important aim is to contribute to the development of a framework for better citizen understanding of foreign policy, rather than to add empirical or theoretical insights to the study of international relations. Such an understanding should build upon past studies of power, diplomacy and regional politics and development. The following three sections deal with these topics in turn. The final sections take up United States policies and some tentative conclusions.

POWER

A. General Concepts

Power is conventionally defined as any ability to bring about desired behavior in another person or entity. Often, but not always, the condition of resistance is included. That is, the targeted actor is induced to do something that would not otherwise have been done. Since resistance can also be a response to the exercise of power, however, it should not at the same time be a necessary precondition if cause and effect are not to be confused.

The essential elements of power analysis are actor(s), target(s), and behavior. Not only is it desirable to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary behavior. It is also helpful to compare power to influence, consider cooperation as well as conflict, look into how information functions in persuasion, pursue the roles of symbolism, and especially question the essentiality of force or violence in the exercise of power. Some of these can only be mentioned in passing in this paper.

In the broadest sense, power is of three kinds: coercive, utilitarian and normative. The same terms are used to characterize both power assets, the possessions of an actor that represent potential power, and relations to be considered when power is actually exercised toward a target. The three forms of power apply at all levels of social analysis, from interpersonal to international. (Etzioni 1968, 96, 357-58. Elsewhere he also uses "persuasive" for "normative," 358, and "remunerative" for "utilitarian," 1961, 5.)

A more popularized, but still general, set of terms includes condign, compensatory and conditioned instruments of power, stemming, originally, from personality, property and organizational sources. (Galbraith 1983, 4-7) While at first glance these seem to correspond exactly to coercive, utilitarian and normative power, the condign is in fact equated with punishment and compensatory with reward, even for verbal acts, so that the possibilities of positive/negative symmetries over all categories are lost. Emphasis on conditioning as manipulation, moreover, makes this scheme less useful in international than in interpersonal studies.

The negative/positive/conditioned taxonomy nevertheless appeared in the basic discourse on realism in international politics. Power is defined there as control employing three motivations: "the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, the respect or love for men or institutions." Such control is exercised over the "minds and actions of other men" by "holders of public authority." (Morgenthau 1978, 30-31) Military, economic and cultural methods are also discussed, but only in terms of imperialistic policies. (62ff.) These three are also called threats, bribes and logic. (Maynes 1985, 111)

Some writers distinguish between diplomatic and propaganda methods, in addition to the military and economic. (Palmer & Perkins 1969, 33-34; Baldwin 1985, 13-14) Military and economic power draw upon material assets and create physical consequences. They are therefore fairly straightforward and easier to assess, if not to measure. Diplomacy and propaganda, on the other hand, use primarily the intangible or symbolic assets of national power, comparable to cultural methods. In reality, however, they differ not because one relies primarily upon negotiation and the other on verbal symbols (Baldwin 1985, 13), but only in that they target either foreign governments or foreign publics.

Here these two intangible forms of power are combined as diplomatic power, rather than cultural, to emphasize their common characteristics and sources. This combination adopts a broad, and unconventional, definition of diplomacy as including any mediation among cultures (Robert Rossow ms. n.d.), and "beliefs, attitudes" etc. in addition to behavior, whether directed at or by either official or non-official entities or persons. (Baldwin 1985, 9, similarly includes non-state targets, but not actors in his definition of statecraft.) The threefold concept of power is consistent with conventional theory at the general level, that is, coercive (military), utilitarian (economic), and normative (diplomatic).

B. Qualifying Concepts

While classifying power to understand it better, it is well to remember that its forms are indivisible, not only in being mutually supportive in actual use (Palmer & Perkins 1969, 33, quoting E.H. Carr), but more important in its cross-sectoral impacts. Economic power is not used only to influence economic behavior; military to affect military; etc. (Morgenthau 1978, 62; Baldwin 1985, 23-24)

Power becomes still more complex when one distinguishes between the "generalized capacity of an actor . . . to reduce resistance" of others "about a set of matters over a period of time," on the one hand, and "relational and relative" power as actually exercised by one actor "on a single issue over a single subject at one point in time," on the other hand. (Etzioni 1968, 314-15) Or potential power exists as an actor's static (input) assets which are converted by an exchange

process somewhat like finance, into (output) sanctions that reallocate the values of a target. (Deutsch 1966, 120-122; 1968, 41-43; Etzioni 1968, 332-33)

The differences are further described as policy analysis of influence attempts that use techniques of statecraft versus power analysis of capabilities to produce outcomes in international politics. (Baldwin 1985, 22-24) The latter approach is closer to what is attempted here, as it emphasizes the power bases, or resources, rather than specific means by which they are used. (16-18) Distinctions useful for research purposes need to be reconsidered in terms of policymaking stages (below).

Each form of power implies its own kind of involvement between actors and targets, and affecting their relations. Involvement can be alienative, calculative or moral, or combinations of these. While any of them may be associated with any of the forms of power, there are congruencies between coercion and alienation, utilitarian power and calculation, and normative power and moral involvement. And power itself generates resistance in the target to which it is applied. (Etzioni 1968, 9ff., 352)

More specifically, in normative relationships

> the relating actors treat each other as goals, and their mutual commitments are non-rational. Utilitarian relations entail a complementary interest; the actors treat each other as means, and commitments are rational. Coercion entails the use . . . of means of violence . . . . Actors treat each other as objects, and the commitment may be either rational or non-rational.
> (Etzioni 1968, 96)

Cooperation is more likely to occur within normative relationships, contained conflict within the utilitarian, and uncontained conflict within the coercive, but the opposite effects may be felt by outsiders. That is, the integrative bonding effects of norms, such as nationalism, within one group can increase its conflict with other groups. (97)

C. Related Concepts

Further discussion of power within communities is needed to understand more fully its place in relations among them. This can begin by linking power to such terms as force, authority and influence. One view is that might is mere force, which can be exercised arbitrarily; power is force exercised according to rules which themselves can be arbitrary; and authority is the justification which makes the rules "worthy of respect and obedience." Each of these aspects can be evaluated separately as a system or order, having efficacy (of might), validity (of power) and legitimacy (of authority). (Passerin d'Entreves 1967, 2-7) While all three add up to national sovereignty, this is not to say that power and authority cannot exist independently of force and bring about compliance. (126-29)

Influence, although sometimes equated to power (Baldwin 1985, 9n, 20), is more precisely distinguished as bringing about a change of preferences, while the exercise of power is said to suppress preferences. (Etzioni 1968, 360) Others have reversed the relationship, giving influence the ability only to affect behavior without necessarily requiring compliance. (Hoffmann 1978, 114; Morgenthau 1978, 31) Still others maintain that influence brings about compliance

by offering rewards, in contrast to power which threatens sanctions (and force which actually applies them). (Ferris 1973, 4-5) Influence is most closely related to normative, or persuasive, power "since both are symbolic and draw on values and sentiments." When combined on a continuum the two are called "normative control." (Etzioni 1968, 360)

Growth of power in recent centuries, especially in democracies, is viewed by some as destructive of more traditional controls on human behavior. (Jouvenel 1949, 375ff.; Galbraith 1983, 181-82; Nisbet 1966, 107-08, 120ff.) Others see it as "a veritable technological take-off in the productivity of power . . . . a new 'economy' of power, that is to say . . . . new techniques are both much more efficient and much less wasteful. . . ." Power conceived as repression is "purely juridical . . . . a wholly negative, narrow, skeletal conception . . . which has become curiously widespread." (Foucault 1984, 60-61)

Such a positive view of power, not destroying values (even traditional ones) but building on them, opens up new avenues of its meaning apart from the use of violence or force. The institutionalizing of power, which "often appears in the guise of authority," put restraints on the use of violence rather than loosing it. What makes authority different from violence? "It is the people's support that lends power to the institutions of a country. . . ." While its "extreme form is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All." (Arendt 1970, 41, 46) "Power and violence, though they are distinct phenomena, usually appear together," but power "is the primary and predominant factor." (52) "Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it." (56)

"To generate power is not necessarily to rely on force or to be coercive." (Etzioni 1968, 320) "The sources of societal power are many and varied and include . . . the loyalties of the membership. . . . Societal conflict . . . . is a major (although by no means the only) expression of power." To make power "a central element of societal analysis is not to assume that other elements--especially goals and values, knowledge and commitment--are less important. On the contrary, we view societal power as a form of the mobilization of societal energy in the service of societal goals." (319)

Such a positive view is found also in Talcott Parsons, who "defined power as the capacity of a social system to mobilize resources to attain collective goals." (quoted in Habermas 1983, 172) Such a broad concept, however, loses the distinction between power and violence.

> Hannah Arendt proceeds from a different model of action, the communicative: 'Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert.' The basic phenomenon is . . . the formation of a common will in a communication aimed at agreement. (Habermas 1983, 172)

This version of communicative action has been criticized for ignoring broader aspects of power analysis. For purposes of this paper, however, it is enough that it exists without having to adopt it wholesale. Discussion of foreign policy stages in the next section may put the positive aspects of power into an acceptable international context.

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DIPLOMACY

If normative power exists, it still remains to establish that diplomacy qualifies as such and that diplomatic power is significant in American foreign policy as actually directed at southern Africa from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. This section deals with the first; the second is left for the third.

A. What is it?

Diplomacy is variously described and still more diversely used in popular, professional, and official statements about foreign policy and world politics. The confusion about diplomacy is so great that, in contrast to power, it is rarely seen as a research concept. In a literature search, the keyword diplomacy can be relied upon to turn up a large number of unwanted references, but without including every work of potential interest. The term is thus too inclusive but not sufficiently exhaustive to serve many purposes.

At one extreme, diplomacy can refer to decisions about all aspects of foreign policy, a parallel to strategy. At this level diplomacy has been called the "brains of power," giving "direction to all the other elements" and able to make all decisions including the use or threat of violence. (Osgood 1953, 13, 435) This seems to be an idealized conception, so broad as to be meaningless. Foreign policy has also been called the substance of a state's conduct of relations with other states, while diplomacy is the process by which it occurs. (Watson 1983, 11)

At the other extreme, diplomacy is merely tactics, the implementation of foreign policy "without recourse to violence." (Webster 1961, 2) Whatever they may intend, diplomatic memoirs usually weigh in at the tactical end, so that diplomacy becomes that which diplomats do. (See Thayer 1959) Some of the traditionalists even proudly prefer it so, just minding the store, so to speak, out of distate for domestic politics. (Kennan 1959, 106) From them, however, we learn little that is systematic, except that diplomacy is a demanding skill, requiring rare qualities of knowledge, discipline and habits of thought.

Neither the broad nor the narrow definition of diplomacy is much help in understanding its role as national power. Nor was the division in the previous section between power bases, or capabilities, and the techniques of statecraft, which reveal actors' intentions in specific influence attempts. Clearly it is necessary to cut across strategy and tactics, or formulation and execution, of foreign policy to discover and describe the proper place of diplomacy.

Several obstacles stand in the way. First, both policy and power analyses have neglected non-coercive resources of foreign policy for most of the past 40 years. Early postwar experts, both officials and scholars, quickly adopted the "new foreign policy wisdom" of national security predominance, built around the idea that negotiation with the Soviet Union "could only be dangerous" and "a diplomatic settlement was impossible." (Yergin 1977, 244, 400) While "the exercise of national power can take many forms, ranging from moral and rational persuasion to physical coercion . . . the chief measure" is coercion. (Osgood 1953, 13)

This emphasis persists. While it may be agreed that authority, as discussed above, in international affairs "is transmuted into prestige," (Niebuhr 1959, 108)

the bases of prestige may be traced "ultimately" mainly to "victory in the last hegemonic war" among the dominant powers and only secondarily to their abilities to provide "certain public goods" and "ideological, religious, or other values" which "are usually weak or nonexistent." (Gilpin 1981, 30, 34)

By the 1960s awareness of the unusability of nuclear weapons (Kissinger 1964, 35), and by the 1970s the constraints expected from detente, had shifted attention to interdependence, especially to economic power. (Morse 1972, 135-36) Issues of the environment, resource depletion and technology loomed larger, until these too were displaced by terrorism and revival of Cold War concerns. But in the 1980s, economic statecraft could still be called a neglected field of study. (Baldwin 1985, 29)

Second, diplomacy suffered throughout from association with Wilsonian internationalism, with its roots supposedly in moralism-legalism, while military and economic power seemed to function more directly in the service of realism and self-interest. A pale substitute for physical power, diplomacy was easily equated to weakness, a channel to be used only when other alternatives failed. Or its meaning was further obscured by terms--all meaning something else--such as the "new" diplomacy of altered agendas, limits of power, and interdependence (Hoffmann 1978, 1; Nye 1976, 135-37); public diplomacy as another name for propaganda (foreign and domestic); and coercive diplomacy of threats. (Lauren 1979, 183ff.)

Finally, foreign policy dilemmas in past decades have produced mountains of organizational studies or focussed on personalities of leaders, as if changes in either would resolve all problems. The tools of policy tend to be overlooked (Maynes 1985, 111) as do the intangible sources of national power.

More narrowly than total strategy, therefore, diplomacy can better be regarded as that form of national power which does not rely primarily on force or wealth, on the one hand, and (more broadly than tactics) as those corresponding techniques of statecraft (non-coercive, non-economic) that include both official and non-official players and issues.

By exchanges of visits late in 1977, for example, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin mobilized or actualized enormous diplomatic power in both Egypt and Israel, permitting them to make peace in 1979. Their agreements at Camp David were mixed outcomes after President Carter used explicit economic power (in the form of aid) and implicit military power (security guarantees). Similarly, Jesse Jackson called upon intangible reservoirs of approval in both Syria and the United States in 1984 when he went to Damascus to obtain the release of US Navy Lieutenant Robert O. Goodman, Jr., shot down over Lebanon during a retaliatory raid from an offshore carrier.

It is also necessary to say what diplomacy is not. "Conduct of foreign relations" is too vague, partly because it implies passivity or steady state activities and partly because it includes economic and military affairs. Nor does it begin with formal recognition of a regime or end with its withdrawal, as our relations with Cuba, Angola and the Philippines have demonstrated.

"Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate." Thus did President Kennedy in 1961 make a commitment to diplomacy, which was not dependent on military power. But negotiation is only a formal process for

seeking agreement--a code-word for diplomacy but not the whole of it. As staff meetings are to management, so negotiation is to diplomacy. One method of negotiating is bargaining, but this too is inadequate as a synonym for diplomacy.

Compromise may be an outcome of tactit or organized negotiating. But it is not a touchstone of diplomacy, and to use it as one simply adds to diplomacy's bad name. Signs of President Reagan's shift to diplomacy, as it was called, were cast entirely in terms of his willingness to compromise when his first-term policies were assessed in 1984. (Gelb & Lake 1984) And judging foreign policies in terms of "declaratory" (by implication, weak) and "operational" (strong) acts (Bell 1984) only adds to confusion about what is real and what is mere imagery.

B. Foreign Policymaking Stages

The foregoing may be simplified for present purposes by using a set of three policymaking stages. They reflect three possible conditions, rather than a prescribed sequence, and are called aspirations, postures and action. Any of them can exist independently or in combination with either or both of the others.

The meaning of the three stages was illustrated in some of the American responses to the 1986 Philippine election. On February 7 American hopes were focussed on two main values which were believed to be at stake in the Philippines. One was the restoration of democratic choice (as imagined in the former colonial power). The other was retention of military base rights there, or of the alliance they represented. Many American probably regarded both as equally important and hoped to achieve both through the election. Others might have sacrificed one to achieve the other. But it was impossible to say exactly where American consensus lay before the election.

Postures enter into policymaking whenever preparations are needed to create a position (physical or psychological) from which action can be taken with good chances of success. In the Philippine case there were reports of studies being made of alternative Pacific base sites that could be used if the US should be forced out of Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. But it did not appear from public reports that the groundwork had been laid for choices, much less for actual movements to new bases.

With respect to an American posture on free choice for the Filipinos, only a general value preference existed. To supply a base for popular assessment of the justice of the election process, Senator Lugar's delegation went to observe it first-hand. This seemed risky enough at the time. In light of events it would have seemed foolhardy. Had its precipitating effects been anticipated, the delegation might never have gone. That it was can be explained by assuming that both 1) the voting strength of a united political opposition and 2) the brazenness of official fraud had been underestimated.

Once the Lugar delegation returned with a negative judgment on the election process, Ambassador Habib had to be sent as a final preparatory move, presumably making a last, good-faith effort at mediation, but actually telling President Marcos privately that he should start the transition to a change of regime. (Only its privacy, and therefore short-term deniability, made this a preparatory posture rather than a definitive act, until it was stated publicly on February 24.) The February 23 threat to withhold military and economic aid was an exercise of those forms of power, if Marcos used force against the dissidents.

The decisive US action of February 24, however, was diplomatic. It does not have to be credited with bringing down Marcos. The key point of tactics was its timing, after military units rebelled but before the outcome was clear; the fulcrum of strategy was the answer it finally gave, after considerable uncertainty, about how the dilemma of aspirations was resolved. But it had been predictable from the testimony of Secretary Shultz the week before, putting American value priority on democracy over base rights. Or, as a conservative senator explained, we would rather see long-range freedom with temporary loss of the bases, than to keep the bases briefly and sacrifice democracy permanently.

This diversion is offered, not only for its implications in southern Africa, but primarily to illustrate the nature of the diplomatic power base and its relationship to the stages of policymaking. It was no mere quirk of protocol that (according to news reports the week after the Philippine election) the only congratulations received by Ferdinand Marcos on his re-election came from the Soviet Union. They had nothing to lose. The US, in contrast, with more at stake took more than two weeks working out its conflict of values. If President Reagan had reached the opposite conclusion--putting bases above democracy--in order to continue supporting Marcos, he would have been asserting a military power priority. But such a decision might have been contradicted by the Congress, if it withheld Philippine aid appropriations, and by criticism from the American public and the media. Such is the power of diplomacy at the level of strategy that, win or lose, the choices have to be acceptable to constituents.

C. Dimensions of Power

It is still necessary to compare diplomacy with the other forms of national power. Five dimensions of power are discussed for this purpose:

1. Domestic/foreign
2. Positive/negative
3. Short/long-term
4. Small/large powers
5. Active/adaptive

1. Domestic/Foreign Dimensions. Recall from the previous section that a general power theory applies at all levels of society, from interpersonal to international. At many lower levels of interaction, normative power is the only form that is socially acceptable. For example, within national societies such as ours, both buying votes and intimidating voters are prohibited. Money still has power, but its use is circumscribed, for example, to rule out an employer's demands for sexual favors from employees. Violence is reserved to the state and criminalized for others. Someone has said that crime is expected, but not accepted; just as saintliness is accepted, but not expected. A norm is anything that is both accepted and expected.

The modern state also institutionalized the Hegelian idea of the common good and "society as an end" satisfies the criteria for a normative power base domestically. Its acceptance did not depend on domestic legislation. Instead, "an evolution of political feelings is clear to see; in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries people will be found thinking of society as Hegel did without ever having heard of him . . . his work was merely to endow with form a belief which had always lurked more or less consciously in many minds." (Jouvenel 1949, 48-49)

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Expanding the concept of community to include allied and friendly nations, some of the same constraints apply. We do not threaten western Europe with armed invasion or nuclear missiles. Even incipient trade wars among allies are regarded as inappropriate, if sometimes unavoidable. In an alliance, "tutelage . . . is demoralizing in the long run." (Kissinger 1983, 109) The United Kingdom, and especially its Conservative Prime Minister, were apalled at having no warning of the 1983 US landings in Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth. Even the Americans least in favor of detente in the 1970s registered outrage at Soviet-sponsored moves that "violated the spirit" of it in the Third World.

Being most conscious of rules as incorporated in domestic law, we are tempted to search for order among nations only in those same forms. Law is often weak or inarticulate internationally, and except as policy of dominant states it is always without reliable means of objective enforcement. (Woodward 1974, 158; McDougall 1984, 202) Therefore it is easy to discount or neglect diplomatic power based on shared norms, beliefs or values. But "international law . . . still remains . . . a legal system structurally different. . . ." from that of the state. (Passerin d'Entreves 1967, 127)

One way of resolving the domestic-international law conflict is to liken the former to an "Indictment Model" in which punishment by legislated, due process is taken for granted, while international law--at least for the present--mainly follows a "Responsibility Model" in which communities take on less formal obligations to repudiate certain acts and to resist the policies associated with them. (Falk 1974, 126ff.)

Speaking on terrorism and its evils, therefore, American officials not only appeal to laws and conventions, but also use such emotional terms as decency, civilization and barbarians. In so invoking the common good beyond national borders, however, they are humanly prone to build upon existing, integrative bonding and thereby to increase conflict with outsiders. That is, instead of widening consensus (for example, with Arab and Moslem countries), they draw down the reserves of agreement that already exist (especially in western Europe, but also elsewhere). Rather than creating or enlarging a power base, they help to deplete it.

Authorities agree on the existence and function of transnational norms. "Intangible assets are a form of power." (Hoffmann 1978, 111) "While capabilities are objectively measurable, power must in every case be evaluated in more subtle psychological and relational terms." (Stoessinger 1969, 15) Even two prominent realists concur. The author of what is called "the most influential postwar textbook," (Keohane & Nye 1983, 119) wrote quite early that the very purpose of all negotiation is "the transformation of conflicting or inchoate interests into a common purpose of the contracting parties." (Morgenthau 1959, 11) And before joining the government, Henry Kissinger said that "international consensus" protects neutral and small countries from great power ruthlessness. (1964, 21, 36)

In common with the tendency to look abroad for counterparts of domestic law, many have pursued some form of world government as a guarantee of order and justice comparable to those at home. But order is not always preplanned, democratic or pluralist (as we know these qualities). Two tendencies have existed.

One thread is followed by diplomatists and some scholar-diplomats like Kissinger. Reverence for the classical systems of diplomacy encourages adherence to habits of thought borrowed from earlier times, without recognizing basic changes that took

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place in this century. A major result was the US-Soviet detente, developing from the 1950s until the accommodations of the 1970s. It differed, however, from the 19th Century Concert of Europe in that the powers of the earlier period felt "a common duty as well as a common interest." (Bell 1977, 25) Moreover, this sense of responsibility was a vestige of personal authority that had been shifting since the French Revolution. "A 'de-personalization' of power set in that completely altered the perspectives with which men had been familiar until then." (Passerin d'Entreves 1967, 94) "It was not that the throne was overthrown, but that the whole, the nation-person, mounted it." (Jouvenel 1949, 47)

Yet neither the Concert of Europe nor the 1970s detente were conceived or maintained purely by force. The first depended heavily upon a rough equality of resources among five European states, a transnational elite of rulers and diplomats, and consensual rules of external conduct, if not of domestic ideologies. (Hoffmann 1978, 39, 69; Langhorne 1981, 4) The original four, later joined by France, shaped a conception of "the political unity of Europe" and spoke "'in the name of Europe which forms but a single whole.'" (Morgenthau 1978, 224) Detente, which became triangular after inclusion of China, involved three separate ideologies and strategies, both of which are subject to moral judgments. (Bell 1977, 4)

Another tendency was the urge to universalize domestic values, which formed the core of Wilsonian internationalism in this century. Supposedly originating in an American "passion for control" and consciousness of our own uniqueness, it set up an insurmountable "values gap." Internationalism peaked in the 1960s, with the Vietnam War "a castrophe resulting largely from misplaced idealism." (Hoffmann 1978, 224; see also Ullman 1975-76, 110; and Hughes 1985-86, 40) But the terms internationalist versus isolationist were outmoded decades ago, replaced by questions of degrees of activism and directions of adaptation in foreign policy, to be discussed further.

2. Positive/Negative Dimensions. Beyond domestic/foreign issues are others which bear upon the effects of power in the target countries. Divergent impacts of different forms of power were already mentioned. What role can diplomacy play in the promotion of order, and possibly of justice (beyond the scope of this paper), which might work outside or in spite of great power tendencies to dominate by force or to universalize their values?

If the state of global society is uncertain or transitional, then diplomacy could have an evolutionary part in the changes already in progress. "The function of a system of international relationships is not to inhibit . . . change . . . but rather to facilitate it. . . . This is a task for diplomacy. . . . For this, law is too abstract, to inflexible. . . ." (Kennan 1951, 97-98) Detente was judged in retrospect to be a "strategy for the management of adversary power" and as a process of using diplomacy to turn the tension between a legitimate and a revolutionary order in a creative direction. (Bell 1977, 6, 24) Diplomacy as responsibility can be seen not only as causation and as morality, but also as prudence, that is, acting out of self-interest in cooperation with others. (Watson 1983, 195-97) The greater the power of a state, the greater its interest and duty --its responsibility--to act by example to create order.

Institutions can codify but they do not create stable relationships. "Custom [is] far more important as a source of law than . . . command." (Rostow 1968, 1ff.) Three kinds of rules of conduct exist: ethics, mores and law. These three differ

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not at all in what they may command, but only in the sanctions they apply (conscience, ostacism and punishment, respectively). (Morgenthau 1978, 232-33) "Diplomacy does not exist either in a 'state of nature,'" where violence rules, "or in a developed state of society, where law is effectively administered." (Wright 1959, 56) Therefore, "the task of diplomacy is to convert the world community into a body politic. . ." that embodies norms approaching the ideals of order. (Rostow 1968, xvi)

Global prospects for order through diplomacy rest not only on adversary proceedings and the possible triumph of one side or the other, but also on hard work of accommodating interests. There is "no substitute for universal bargaining, issue by issue, deal by deal," as the scope of diplomacy is enlarged. (Hoffmann 1978, 189) Or in Kissinger's words, "We are immersed in an unending process. . . . The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral [and] far transcend the physical balance of power." (Kissinger 1983, 111)

An early inquiry posed the issue of morality as a conflict between "national self-interest" on the one hand and "universal ideals" on the other. (Osgood 1953, 1-2) When thus bracketed, morality reverts to a universal crusade for western, Christian, liberal ideology (Niebuhr 1959), and diplomacy becomes global propaganda. The key, however, is not how much weight separate governments may give to "transcendant ideals" in making foreign policy, if those ideals do not transcend their own borders. Instead, it is where and how often pairs or numbers of states can find common cause out of their individual beliefs, values and goals.

The need for mutual gain is well-recognized in formal negotiations, especially with regimes in whom we have the least trust. "A given strategy . . . may be equally useful to either party to the conflict." (Bell 1977, 4) Kissinger, for example, sought to overcome disagreements that "illuminate the as-yet undiscovered sense of community." He also repeated the rule often cited as a guide to dealing with the Soviets, that "an agreement will be maintained only if all partners consider it in their interest. They must have a sense of participation in the result." (Kissinger 1982, 214)

3. Short/Long-term Dimensions. Each form of national power has its own time horizons, as well as the other characteristics just discussed. The time frames estimated to bring a power base into existence (production) and thereafter to deploy it in a specific situation (positioning) correspond roughly to the aspirations and postures stages, respectively, of policymaking. Both are largely determined internally in the actor country, subject to some external influences. A third dimension (impact) coincides with the action stage and is mostly subject to conditions in the target country.

A crucial factor in determining how long each stage might require in specific situations is its degree of central control. Generalizations are risky, but some rough estimates are possible. Thus, a regularity among the three forms of power can be expected in degrees of dispersion/centralization of control. Diplomatic power, being symbolic, is by definition the most widely dispersed in a society's cultural values and beliefs. These are elements least amenable to central control, at least on short notice. Diplomatic, or normative, power should therefore change less rapidly than other power bases in the production dimension. Postures of diplomatic power may be shifted more rapidly. Without exploring it further, the relevant mechanism of change may be leadership, while that of stability is ideology.

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Examples of production and positioning of diplomatic power include: a) internationalism of the postwar era, which was a composite of "potentially unstable . . . constituencies" with divergent objectives in liberal-progressive universalization and cold war anticommunism (Hughes 1985-86, 37-40); popular acceptance of detente with the Soviet Union, against contradictory pressures from the Cold War, beginning with Churchillian speculations of the early 1950s (Bell 1977, 8ff.); c) rapid US public and official turnarounds on China through the ping pong dilomacy of the early 1970s; yet d) the Vietnam War and other major events which appeared by the 1980s to leave "foreign policy beliefs of American leaders . . . quite stable" in an altered distribution. (Holsti & Rosenau 1983, 211)

Physical forms of power, being less symbolic and more tangible, pose different problems. In the production phase it is assumed that the resources, or raw materials, needed to creat each kind of power base exist, but that they are not developed. In a country like the United States, or most capitalist and mixed-economy democracies, the time required for production is expected to vary inversely with central control. Developing an economic power base, as some Third World experiences show, can be very time-consuming, requiring some changes of societal structures and often of cultures as well.

Depending on conditions, however, it can also occur rapidly, if unevenly, as Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea and other newly-developing countries have demonstrated. Capabilities of capital and labor and how they respond to central direction are important. With ample resources of different kinds, present-day China and Saudi Arabia after the 1973 oil price changes embarked on such efforts. Once created, redeployments of economic power bases can also be difficult to achieve, as was the case with western efforts to counter the OPEC oil price changes, due in part to private control of resources and trading channels.

Military production from an adequate economic base can be lengthy, but still it is likely to be faster than this dimension of the other two forms of power. Cuba under Castro (granting the stimulus of outside aid) and prospects for a rearmed Japan would be cases to consider. Redirecting military power, even though it is designed for flexibility and mobility, can be slow if new doctrine is involved. In summary, creation of power bases of any kind "from scratch" is likely to be slow, but positioning of them once produced can be easier for diplomatic power than for military or economic.

The impacts of different forms of power on target countries, being subject to specific conditions in each case, are impossible to estimate in general. In any event, the terms of economic competition and of military tests of strength are discussed at length in many works. The point to be recalled here is that success of diplomacy in concrete cases depends on agreement of values in actor and target countries, as the outcome of US policy in the Philippine election showed. In contrast, impacts of the other two forms of power are ambiguous. Disputes over the effects of economic sanctions often are resolved only by references to their symbolic significance, which has normative implications, or to military power in reserve. (Baldwin 1985, 134ff.) Not only does coercive power, as demonstrated in Vietnam and Afghanistan, generate enormous resistance, but "societal bonds that are only utilitarian (not to mention [those that are] only coercive) are inherently unstable." (Etzioni 1968, 352, 98)

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To this point in discussing the dimensions of diplomacy it has been suggested 1) that continuity of domestic norms and foreign policy expressions of them are important; 2) that diplomacy from such a power base is creative if used positively; and 3) that such diplomacy can be flexible and rapidly applied by leadership. Size of actor and target countries is considered next.

4. Small/Large Countries. Obviously much of the foregoing applies generally only to countries like the United States, with large surplus resources. Smaller countries have fewer options, yet precisely for this reason their conduct is instructive to those who want or need to use limited power efficiently. Typically, the best the small countries can hope for is to use their physical (economic and military) power defensively. They may, it is true, take offensive actions against small neighbors, but such risks demand high degrees of normative power as well, lest the target countries find allies or protectors among other countries. The Iran-Iraq War is a constant reminder.

In general, therefore, diplomacy is the main, if not the sole, reliance of smaller and poorer countries. And most often their aim is not to reach a position of using physical forms of power aggressively, but rather to avoid such a contingency. They do not renounce physical forms of power, but the most experienced of them typically take care to make their foreign policies consistent with internal values, to make them positive with countries that matter most, and to adopt long-range strategies.

The Nordic states of Europe provide a rich store of examples of small-country diplomacy. All five are relatively strong and healthy economically, homogeneous ethnically, and self-reliant militarily. The last includes, however, a wide range of defensive postures, from Iceland without an army and outside of NATO, but host to a US Air Force Base; Norway and Denmark members of NATO but excluding nuclear weapons in peacetime; Sweden non-aligned but maintaining high-performance defense forces and making many of its own weapons; to Finland aspiring to non-alignment while party to a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

Finland's case is especially instructive, if viewed outside of some western leaders' fears of its spreading to the continent. Formerly ruled in turn by both Sweden and Russia, the Finns played a role of anti-Soviet outpost of the West in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1944 its conservative-centrist leaders deliberately set out to remove any future grounds for Soviet aggression. It was a matter of survival, with some sacrifices of independence to realism. Its closest calls with the Soviets, now decades past, resembled some aspects of recent US-Philippine dialogue. It has never reached the fever pitch of current US-Nicaraguan relations.

Similarly, Norway faced with a bonanza of North Sea oil discoveries, carefully scheduled their exploitation to insulate a somewhat reclusive domestic society from being thrust headlong into economic development or overwhelming influex of outsiders. Some Americans see Nordic neutralism, in its varied shades, as negative. The policies of the late Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, were so regarded before he was killed. It is surprising, however, that in this respect they are often close to those of our two nearest neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Seasoned diplomats of all these countries would probably say in response that they are aligned with a stable core of American beliefs and attitudes, rather than going along with changing policies of successive US administrations.

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5. Active/Passive Dimension. In light of the internationalism of most of the post-World War II era it is easy to forget that other approaches to US foreign policy are possible. The full range of such possibilities is not captured, however, by the old contrast with isolationism, much less by the neo-isolationism that some detected in the 1970s. Nor is the issue entirely one of liberal-conservative differences, since much of the backlash against foreign assistance, for example, united people of both persuasions.

The common tendency of American superpower policies since the 1940s, already mentioned, has been to universalize domestic values. But doubts accumulated in the 1960s and felt in the 1970s brought forth objections to "policing the world" or otherwise exceeding the newly-perceived limits of American power. Thus were revealed the twin choices comprising postwar internationalism. On the one hand, it had asserted a more active role against the passivity or "quietist idealism . . . renouncing action in the world, while hoping to improve it by a stern refusal to recognize what one did not like." (Hoffmann 1978, 220)

On the other hand, the urge to export American institutions was no longer taken for granted. Jimmy Carter took office at the height of the questioning. No less active in the world than his predecessors, he represented a willingness to accommodate domestically to what was happening in the world, which could not be changed. This was a reversal of trying to make the world adapt to the United States, a sharp break with this side of Wilsonian universalism. The election of Ronald Reagan made another 180° turn, not to a wholesale revival of fortress America concepts, however much some of his supporters might feel nostalgia for some features of isolationism. Instead, he reasserted the theme of universalizing our preferences to the world. "Walking tall," Reagan embraced the line of Democratic presidents from Kennedy back to Wilson.

The human rights issue, of which South Africa offers the prime test, was an exception to these generalizations. Its place is easily obscured by the fact that both Carter and Reagan are moralizers. But in general Carter preached to America, while Reagan preaches to the world. In South Africa, they exchanged roles for a time. In a framework of comparative policies worldwide, however, Reagan is activist and outwardly adaptive; Carter was activist and inwardly adaptive. (Rosenau 1970; Kegley & Wittkopf 1979) Both these directions of adaptation go beyond the well-recognized blurring of domestic and foreign policies (Nye 1976, 137-39) or whether or not we are vitally affected by others' forms of government and observance of civil rights. (Ullman 1976)

Activism, or passivity, indicate the amount of initiative exercised by a government, regardless of the direction of adaptation it emphasizes. (Some may prefer to think in terms of proactive and reactive policies, or to call the mid-1970s a period of "detachment." Ullman 1976, 110ff.) But it might be said that all US administrations since Eisenhower, or perhaps even since Coolidge, have been mainly activist.

Examples of concrete choices of adaptation and activism are many, especially in foreign trade policy. In the mid-1980s the US had large and growing deficits in its overseas balances, up to one third of which were accounted for by one country, Japan. Such a problem posed the question for the US auto industry, in particular, whether to build for domestic tastes and let the rest of the world buy if it wanted, or to adjust to foreign competition and try to sell the resulting product to buyers at home.

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An expressed allegiance to free trade generally made the Reagan Administration ideologically favor inward adaptation, in contrast to its opposite tendencies on other issues. Its other option, however, was to remain somewhat passive--as easy choice where private interests have the initiative--and let economic forces work things out. Pressures from both public and private activists, including Congress, led the Japanese in 1985-86 to extend their voluntary quotas on auto exports to the United States.

The importance to diplomacy of these dimensions of power is the diversity of options offered, at different times, in different issue areas and with different countries. Where opportunities for cooperative action exist, leaderships can be actively creative, taking advantage of shared purposes of two or more countries. Choices between inward and outward adaptation then become somewhat academic, unless the burden of past ideologies, or placing particular countries, regimes or leaders in "good" or "bad" categories have reduced the flexibility and limited the power of diplomacy.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

How can US policies in southern Africa be interpreted against this discussion of diplomatic power? And what does the combination of principles and practice mean for the average citizen's understanding of the acts of government and other institutions?

This paper does not attempt to assess the successes of the foreign policies of past administrations; still less does it address questions of their rightness. From the citizen's standpoint, without the detailed knowledge of both changing conditions and available tools, it is difficult to prescribe specific moves for policymakers. Moreover, it is useless to do so, given the variations in degrees of citizen control, for those stages of policymaking and forms of power where citizen control is weakest.

The South African case is an exception, however, because it involves precisely those points at which citizen control should be maximal, that is, in diplomacy and at the aspirations/production stage as summarized in this table:

Forms of power:	CITIZEN INFLUENCE IN POLICYMAKING STAGES Aspirations/ Production	Postures/ Positioning	Actions/ Impacts
Diplomatic Power	Max.	Mod.	Min.
Economic Power	Mod.	Mod.	Min./Mod.
Military Power	Min.	Min./Mod.	Negl.

Some reasons for the fit between citizen influence and South African policy are:

1) Values important to Americans are at stake in southern Africa, not only for ethnic reasons but also because of century-old missionary, business and professional ties;

2) Ends of US policy in South Africa were articulated by both the Carter and

the Reagan administrations, along with the values at stake, and in private studies of the issues;

3) Plans of the South African government, at least since 1978, were announced and included changing policies in the directions desired by US administrations.

Questions remain, however, with respect to each of the above points, before other forces and the chain of events in the region are taken into account. Such questions include: a) Sufficiency of US citizen influence on values, both as expressed by the US Government and as directed at South Africa by other channels, and even when supported in other forms and at other stages (e.g., economic sanctions); b) Consistency of US postures and actions, even through diplomatic power alone, with the aspirations expressed officially and by US citizens; and c) Adequacy of South African commitments to values desired by US policy and citizen advocates.

Other influences from those already mentioned are by no means peripheral, but the opposite. They begin, of course, with the central self-interest of the South African majority, especially blacks who are not represented at all in the official regime. They are not fully united or agreed on how fast or how far things must change in order to be satisfactory--a vulnerability that white South African regimes have always exploited. Restricted rights even limit the abilities of the majority to articulate their desires.

For these reasons, and as a convenience in discussing them, the policies of neighboring black-led African governments are taken as indicative, if not completely representative, of the desires of the majority within South Africa. This device also implicitly lends weight to the relationships (both their leverages and their vulnerabilities) of those governments (Angola, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mozambique) with South Africa.

A. Background

It is unnecessary here (even if it were possible) to add to the many accounts and analyses of events in South Africa that led to the current situation. It may be useful, however, to draw a few summary points from some of them, for the benefit of readers who have not followed the region closely. These will set the stage for description of US policies in the next section.

Americans do mistakenly date the origins of racial troubles in South Africa only from the past decade or two, conveniently paralleling the growth of the US civil rights movement. While there are connections, for example, with the Black Consciousness moverment (Study 1981, 177ff.), they are not all in one direction. Some Americans say that they gained awareness and pride from the emergence of African countries from colonial status in the 1960s.

In fact, the movement for black political rights in South Africa is at least a century old--older in the British Cape Colony. It spread and deepened after the Dutch settlers (Boers or Afrikaners) trekked north and northeastward to establish new states after 1830. But discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 sent outsiders, development and modernization in pursuit of them, just as it ultimately brought hordes of black workers to the mines and cities. (Noer 1978, 21ff.)

Nor is US involvement in South Africa only of recent date. In the skirmishes that led up to the Boer War, which brought British rule to the Afrikaner states, Americans a hundred years ago were already taking sides--as missionaries, investors and mining engineers. We identified and allied ourselves finally with the Enlish-speaking whites, partly because the Boers were regarded as reclusive, pastoral and anti-progressive. They tried in turn to exclude the outsiders who brought "democracy and enlightened progress." (Study 1981, 342)

"Britain seemed more in accord with the American dedication to Christian evangelism. . . . and the 'uplift' of the black. . ." Americans expected that "the civilizing forces of industrialization, missionary activity, and progressive government would swiftly elevate the African from ignorance and primitiveness. The . . . American Negro would be both an example and an instructor for the black African." (Noer 1978, 37, 111-12) Disillusionment with British policy soon followed the end of fighting in 1903, with even some black Americans suffering personal discrimination in British South Africa. "Britain did have a sincere desire to improve the condition of the African, but had made it clear that racial policy was secondary to economic development and unity among white South Africans." (Noer 1978, 115)

Black political opposition began with modest goals and peaceful methods, in 1912 organizing the African National Congress (ANC) which "is still a leading champion of African rights." Since then the steadily-rising black challenge has been answered with periodically tightening restrictions from the white government. (Study 1981, 169ff.) With Afrikaners a majority among the declining white share of the population, it was predictable that apartheid would become official in 1948 after the Afrikaner National Party won its since-unbroken hold on authority. (Hale 1985, 157-58)

South Africa is no melting pot. Even the Coloured and Asians (mostly Indians), slightly-favored historically and economically, are now closed communities living in a few concentrations where they typically outnumber both whites and black Africans. Both groups were growing, respectively, toward 10 and 3 per cent of the total population of some 30 million. (Danaher 1984, 111) Meanwhile white numbers are declining toward 15 per cent, of whom 60 per cent are Afrikaners. Most of the other whites are English-speakers. Intermarriage, urbanization and higher education have reduced differences among whites, but religious, language and other barriers remain.

Black Africans have more than 70 per cent of the population and the highest growth rate. They are expected to near 75 per cent by the year 2000. (Study 1981, 42-45) Although the government emphasizes tribal and other divisions among non-whites several broadly-based political organizations have developed. These are numerous enough, but tactical and leadership differences, including charges of collaboration against tribal and local officials, prevent a consistent united front even when government repression unites them in opposition to apartheid. Only one, Zulu-based, mass political organization is officially tolerated. Less overtly, trade unions, churches and professional groups exist to articulate black opinion and, at times, can act politically. (Study 1981, 173-98) White pressure groups traditionally divide by language. English-speakers control most private business, but generally avoid politics, on the one hand; the influential Dutch Reformed Church broadly supports apartheid, on the other. (Study 1981, 215-19)

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An American visitor quotes a 1971 speech by a black leader, Steve Biko, who died in the hands of police in 1977. "The tripartite system of fear--that of whites fearing the blacks, blacks fearing whites and the government fearing blacks and wishing to allay the fears amongst the whites--makes it difficult to establish rapport. . . . The fact of living apart . . . makes the aspirations of the two groups diametrically opposed." Recent news blackouts which mask the official violence and growing resistance to it, the journalist says, "may be misleading the ruling white majority into a false sense that there is time to work things out." (Raspberry 1985, 9A)

In the 1970s the pace of impending change accelerated in southern Africa. Young military officers in Portugal, radicalized (at least temporarily) while fighting rebels in the African colonies, overthrew the dictatorship in Lisbon in 1974, leading to independence in 1975 for Mozambique and Angola. (Bell 1977, 159) By 1980 internationally-backed elections in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) completed the line-up of black-governed states bordering South Africa and Namibia on the North. Then in June 1976 the South African police fired on a march by 20,000 African students through the streets of Soweto, touching off an "uprising" over the next sixteen months, in which an estimated 700 to 1,000 or more were killed, mostly by the police. By 1978 the security chief could say that 4,000 youths who had fled the country were in guerrilla training elsewhere. (Study 1981, 168, 183)

The white South African government seemed to respond to regional changes and to its own "Muldergate" scandal that surfaced in the late 1970s. (Grotpeter 1980, 134) Pieter W. Botha replaced John B. Vorster as Prime Minister in January 1979. He not only set about consolidating power and accountability in his own office. (Grundy 1983, 110ff.) He also began signaling social and political change:

> I believe in reforming and improving policies. . . . We must be prepared to eliminate worn-out practices and restrictions. . . . South Africa dare not follow the path of oppressing other races.
> (quoted in Grotpeter 1980, 119)

What became known as "change or die" policies provoked some dissent and one splintering off from the National Party, aroused hopes among some blacks and outsiders, and provided fuel for considerable argument in the US and other countries. Botha was judged better than his predecessors in being "far more committed to reform" and "more willing to confront opposition to his policies head on," but like them in trying to maintain party unity ("the political arm of an ethnic movement") and "to position himself near the center." (Study 1981, 230) Much of his time in office he has been "producing and positioning" his domestic political base, and in 1986 he is expected to retire. (Clough 1985-86, 4)

Many Afrikaners, including the current government, adopted the siege mentality that saw communism assaulting the country in the form of black nationalism. They therefore launched repeated raids into neighboring countries, ostensibly against ANC guerrillas, but also to support rebels challenging established regimes and in other ways to destabilize them. Highly dependent economically on South Africa in the best of circumstances, its neighbors tried in the early 1980s to improve relations with the US and even agreed with South Africa to deny sanctuary or support to each other's dissident forces. (Grundy 1985, 150ff.) Against this background how are the policies of two administrations in the US to be understood?

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UNITED STATES POLICIES

Choices facing the US in southern Africa have long resembled somewhat those in the Philippines in 1985-86--staying with a repressive, authoritarian regime for the sake of tangible interests versus promoting social, economic and political equality consistent with intangible, and longer-term tangible, interests.

The differences in southern Africa are that the case for democracy is stronger, while prospects for change are worse. They do not depend on the tenure of one man; economic and military leverage of the US is much less, or less direct; and the hostile threat of communist gains appears to be more immediate. Until the mid-1970s US foreign policy was quite relaxed about the region. The basic choice was recognized, but resolving it was not an urgent matter. After taking office in 1969, the Nixon Administration produced an assessment that said:

> We can . . . encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies. . . . Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost. (Study 1981, 351-52)

In other words, make economic and military interests central and take the heat from liberal, domestic constituents. US policy was to seek concessions from white regimes in the region and persuade black governments of the advantage of dealing with them. (Bell 1977, 170)

With the independence of Angola and Mozambique, however, and Congressional prohibition of CIA covert aid to Angolan forces supported by South Africa, "Kissinger's total lack of interest or neglect" of African affairs was transformed. (Kraus 1981, 98) US attention has since expanded to focus on the futures of, first, Rhodesia and, second, Namibia, with later extensions to Mozambique. Characteristically, Kissinger saw the issue in East-West terms. In the presidential election year of 1976 he travelled twice to southern Africa and met South African Prime Minister Vorster twice in Europe, all in less than six months. He succeeded in getting Rhodesian transition talks started in Geneva, but they broke down early in 1977. (Study 1981, 354-55; Clough 1984, 98)

A. Carter Policies

It was good or bad luck for Jimmy Carter to campaign for president in one busy year for southern Africa and to take office in another. Among the first policy reviews conducted after inauguration was one on South Africa and Rhodesia. That it got more than perfunctory examination was assured by the commitments of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young. Yet Carter's memoirs mention South Africa only in passing, apologetically noting that on human rights "it was not possible to let any one factor be the sole or dominant one in our decisions." It was the press and public who reminded him in the first months of 1977 that, as if by accident, "human rights had become the central theme of our foreign policy. . . ." (Carter 1982, 145)

Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, gave the issue more space, summarizing the policy thus:

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> To set in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of South Africa toward a biracial democracy while in the meantime forging elsewhere a coalition of moderate black African leaders in order to stem continental radicalization and eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent.
>
> We wanted to help achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe [and] keep up pressure so that by 1980 there would be marked progress in dismantling apartheid in South Africa itself. . . . (Brzezinski 1983, 55)

Prophetic of later developments, however, were repeated references to human rights policy as reflecting Carter's "own religious beliefs," "deep religious commitment," "moral concerns," and "personal commitment." (49, 139, 143) While supporting "Cy and Andy," Brzezinski recalled that "we don't really have any basic concept . . . that we wish to achieve on Africa," "I viewed direct confrontation [with South Africa] as futile and counterproductive," "we should not be out front on Rhodesia," and "we did not have a clear view of where we were headed." (140-42) His strongest statements are reserved for the East-West issue:

> My primary focus was on making certain that we did not ignore the Soviet-Cuban military presence in Africa to the point that the conservative whites in South Africa would be fearful of accepting any compromise solution.
>
> * * *
>
> It seemed to me that we had underestimated the Eastern bloc connection in the region and that Andy and Cy, along with most of those at State, took an excessively benign view of the Soviet and Cuban penetration of Africa, underestimating its strategic implications.
>
> * * *
>
> We were failing to deliver enough to satisfy the black Africans and yet at the same time we were frightening the whites into unshakable intransigence. . . . I felt, as we were leaving office, that we had only just begun to recognize the fundamental outlines of the problem. (Brzezinski 1983, 139-43)

While Carter had begun with a sharp turn on southern Africa, the departure of both Vance and Young before the end of the term reflected the difficulty of the tasks they had assumed there, the confusion of voices that communicated it, and the centrist trend of most administrations that begin at either extreme and end up being remarkably similar in practice. If the Carter years were more different in style than in substance, style is nevertheless important in foreign relations. A major disappointment of those years was the 1977 election "campaign against Jimmy Carter," in which the National Party in South Africa won its largest majority ever. (Study 1981, 359) The main achievement was the process, supported by the US, which brought a black majority government into office in Zimbabwe, foreclosing at least one "major avenue for Soviet and Cuban meddling in southern Africa." (Brzezinski 1983, 143)

By expecting "marked progress in dismantling apartheid" in less than four years, however, the Carter Administration miscalculated the speed of change possible in

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fundamental values and beliefs, or even in political postures. And this optimism was expressed even before the hopeful sounds that issued from the new Prime Minister in 1978. Looking backward, it was

> . . . a great mistake to assume that a radical restructuring of South African society and government was occurring just because Pieter Botha made a few statements to his party, proposed a few changes in the apartheid system, and hinted at more drastic possibilities.
> (Grotpeter 1980, 119)

B. Reagan Policies

Changing presidents in 1981 did not, for once, require a policy review to determine new directions in South Africa. The blueprint was already laid out in that Winter's Foreign Affairs article by Chester A. Crocker, who got the job as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. He is credited with inventing "constructive engagement," the quiet diplomacy for dealing positively with white South Africa (although Brzezinski later wrote that he had called for "constructive global engagement" as a Carter policy four years earlier.) (Brzezinski 1983, 53)

Crocker was no less emphatic than others that change had to occur in South Africa. "As a multiracial democracy, the United States cannot endorse a system that is racist in purpose or effect." How change occurs and who takes part, including the US which could not disengage, he stated, are important in steering "between the twin dangers of abetting violence . . . and aligning ourselves with the cause of white rule." Too much attention to the ultimate goal of dismantling apartheid and creating a new nonracial order, however, obscured the "process of getting there," and led people to expect "a sudden dramatic act, or . . . one concession in one deal." Not revolution, but evolution, and "hundreds of decisions, drawn-out negotiations, and quite probably a combination of violence and politics" would come first. (Crocker 1980-81, 324-27)

The new policy thus differed from Kissinger's in not assuming that the whites were there to stay. It did assume 1) that near-term change would have to be accepted by white South Africans and 2) that Prime Minister Botha was willing to make the needed changes. (Clough 1984, 97) Crocker's appraisal of black power in South Africa was cautious. "Black politics are characterized by an increasingly confident experimentation with various strategies for challenging white control." More frequent were references in the Crocker article to signs of white flexibility:

> demonstrating a degree of fluidity and pragmatism that is without precedent in the past generation.
>
> rethinking process now underway in South Africa.
>
> forms of change now occurring.
>
> politics of Afrikanerdom have become more pragmatic and seemingly rational, less tribal and ideological.
>
> The Botha government has committed itself to a moderate reformist course whose end remains utterly unclear. (Crocker 1980-81, 324-330)

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Calling for "serious thinking about the sequencing and interrelatedness of change," Crocker spelled out a number of areas. But stressing that US power is limited, he warned against judging "how much reform is enough" or expecting that "piecemeal reforms will lead inexorably to basic political change." But "the West has everything to gain if it succeeds in pressing white-led change in the direction of real power-sharing and in strengthening the capacity of blacks inside South Africa to participate in shaping a changing system." (Crocker 1980-81, 326, 348-49)

Some white-led changes did occur in South Africa, but they did not preclude "an escalation and widening of the confrontation. Indeed, after every clash, blacks . . . seem more determined in their opposition. . . ." (O'Meara 1981, 111) As in the previous administrations, change in apartheid quickly became hostage to wider objectives in the region and the world, which in turn were expected to make it easier for South African whites to change apartheid. "Without Western engagement in the region as a whole, it will not be possible to assure that South Africans are permitted to build their own future." (Crocker 1980-81, 345)

The wider setting also allowed constructive engagement of South Africa to survive in an otherwise indifferent or hostile political and bureaucratic environment of Washington, D.C. Secretary of State Alexander Haig made no mention of South Africa or apartheid in his memoirs, and included Crocker's name only in listing his appointments to office. (Haig 1984) One reason was conservative opposition to the whole idea, and to Crocker personally, which once again raised a multitude of voices that threatened to drown out Crocker's careful strategies. The opposition was satisfied only when Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola was made the precondition for South African agreement to United Nations procedures for Namibian independence. This linkage then became a "disingenuous means of shifting the blame for the Namibian stalemate away from South Africa. . . ." (Clough 1984, 98-99; 1985-86, 5-7)

The Reagan priority on southern African stability and security thus seemed to displace human rights. But "one must recognize that the program of apartheid . . . is the single most important source of instability in the region." (Liebenow 1983, 133) In the interests of security the Reagan Administration also encouraged agreements between South Africa and neighboring countries, not to lend sanctuary or support to destabilizing activities against each others' territories. South African observance seemed lax but, on balance, the agreements were successful and especially so in Mozambique, where US relations were improved to the point of aid funds being released. (Clough 1985-86, 7-10) Still negotiations on Namibia and Cuban forces in Angola did not move, and US aid to Angolan rebels was authorized.

Despite differences between Carter and Reagan policies in southern Africa, "substance changed far less than symbolism." Already in 1981, "Crocker's conversion of Reagan and Haig to constructive engagement preserved the continuity of US policy." And by 1985, Reagan had "reverted to an overall position on apartheid every bit as tough as the Carter stance of 1977." The US could then "exercise considerable influence over Pretoria" because of political demonstrations in the US. For the first time "South Africa is viewed as an issue worthy of sustained, high-level attention" in Washington. (Clough 1985-86, 4, 7, 15-16)

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CONCLUSIONS

It was probably the vagueness of the activist Carter policy that raised the most questions about its wisdom, and led by about 1978 to its inclusion of more anticommunist features. Carter even made tentative efforts to repeal the Clark Amendment prohibiting aid to Angolan rebels. (Kraus 1981, 99ff.; Danaher 1984, 133) Moreover, by choosing to emphasize North-South cooperation rather than the East-West competition of Kissinger, Carter was implicitly adapting to "black African nationalism as the driving historical force on the continent. . . . whose development was largely consonant with American interests. . . ." (Study 1981, 356)

Was it a Carter premise, however, that change in South Africa was inevitable and automatic? Would there be effective black uprisings and, if so, what would the US do, other than to get blamed for another (1956) Hungary? Why did Carter not take credit (as Reagan would have done) for Botha's 1978 reform talk and "declare victory"? Would this have been too big a risk in domestic politics, or were policymakers by then so preoccupied with Soviet-Cuban moves that they had lost the initiative?

Just as mystifying as Carter's enmity was the Reagan Administration's willingness to become prisoner of Botha's will and ability to reform his country or to deal constructively with Angola. "The Reagan Administration did not discover the connection between the South African presence in Namibia and the Cuban presence in Angola," but it was the first "to gamble that the link could be placed on the bargaining table without one of the parties using it to block agreement." (Clough 1985-86, 5)

The Reagan Administration probably misjudged even the solidity of white South African will to reform or to set a new regional course. Crocker had warned against expecting white-led change to come from a split within the Afrikaner community. (Crocker 1980-81, 332) In any case, it was recognized in 1981 that the potential for real, white-led change would come not from Botha's liberal wing of the National Party, but from a few "genuine reformers" among the Afrikaners willing to settle for protection of their minority interests because "preserving Afrikaner power at all costs in the long run threatens the very survival of Afrikanerdom." (Study 1981, 231) In fact, the opposite may have happened as was suggested by violations of the government's commitments in Angola and Mozambique, when South African military and intelligence made liers of the government in both places. By 1984 there appeared to be "a large and influential group" in the military that did not accept as inevitable South African withdrawal from Namibia, and this was key. (Clough 1984, 100)

Late in 1984, after the presidential election, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced six criteria to be met before committing US forces overseas. His fifth point said that the "US government should have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress." (Grier; Knickerbocker)

What was needed as a reminder of civil restraints on military power--a kind of codification of Vietnam--is self-evident as regards diplomatic power. And while the tools of both forms of power--weapons or words--can each be used for a time without popular support, the sources of military power are different from those of diplomacy. Organization and technology can contribute critical margins of power to coercive acts or threats, but diplomatic power draws only upon consensus.

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In the southern African case, consensus is used as a shorthand for agreement on the intangibles that determine diplomacy's power. It might be called the "why" test. That is, how much consensus is there on relevant beliefs, values and interests within each country and how much do these intangibles overlap among them? The "why" is the same one asked by the old Army training films with the title, "Why We Fight." Answers to this question do not dictate detailed tactics, but tactics must in the long run be consistent with the bedrock of consensus.

Three kinds of consensus contribute to diplomatic power in the case of South Africa. In terms of this paper, they flow to the US Government from three sources: 1) the American people, 2) the South African government, and 3) the neighboring African states. Congress and the mass media often speak for the US public, or are so interpreted. The South African government represents only the whites, while black Africans inside and outside the country find voices only through the black-led Front Line governments.

Carter's policy had wide support from the first (US public opinion) and the third (other African governments), but it neglected the second (South African government). It seemed to lack even a set of assumptions about probable events, which would have forced decisions on how to deal with the official regime. This led to confusion and finally to retreat.

Reagan's policy began at almost the opposite extreme. It chose cooperation with the South African government, but went so far as to sacrifice wide areas of support from the US public and other African governments. Constructive engagement did incorporate assumptions and a new weighting of the dimensions of power; it probably erred in judging that some movement in desired directions would be accepted as enough.

The opposing directions of Carter's and Reagan's initial policies were not irrelevant, but probably reflected perceived needs to correct the courses of their predecessors. Constructive engagement "had to be tried" as a reversal from the low point of Carter's relations with white South Africa "so that preconditions for truly effective U.S. pressure on South Africa could emerge." (Clough 1985-86, 3) Carter's direction in turn had been intended to restore confidence in the US among blacks after the apathetic treatment of all previous administrations after Kennedy's.

From the outcomes it appears that Carter's approach, however superficial and at times ineptly executed, was more widely supported in the US than Reagan's. Carter lost his bid for re-election for reasons not connected with <u>what</u> he did, or <u>why</u> he did it. His support is confirmed by spreading divestments, anti-apartheid demonstrations, and congressional pressures that brought current Executive policies to more closely resemble those of Carter. Congressional action on economic sanctions in 1985 were called "the black community's greatest foreign policy success." (Longmyer 1985, 10)

Reagan policies sought to retain the domestic base of support by rational argument while departing from the public's perceptions of what was needed. Yet both the original blueprint and its post-mortem five years later called, respectively, for "some minimum level of agreement" among Americans (Crocker 1980-81, 323) and "building a domestic consensus" as the "first priority of any effort to replace

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constructive engagement." (Clough 1985-86, 19) Emphasizing how to reach even agreed goals was too fine a point for anyone impatient to see results, especially when the Crocker manifesto seemed, ignoring the fine print, to promise them results from Botha's reforms within a limited "window of opportunity." (Crocker 1980-81, 345)

Perhaps Carter's policies enjoyed about the same support among black Africans as they did in this country. That they were welcomed for their direction did not prevent objections from being raised about their extent, for example, when Jesse Jackson met with the wrong kinds of blacks on his July 1979 visit to South Africa. (Danaher 1984, 142) The downward turn in relations with black Africa was severe in the case of Reagan, in spite of the importance it placed on countries like Nigeria and claims of increasing aid to the continent. (Liebenow 1983, 98) Crocker did maintain an ability to communicate with black officials and apparently to influence them. If South Africa had really made some reforms, or even had it allowed progress to occur on Namibian independence, the present US Government could have come out a hero. And it may still, but if so the causes will be murky. As in summitry and arms control, the question would be asked, "Was it the 1981 carrot or the 1985 stick that worked?"

Of the importance of "why" to foreign policy, no one can give a sure measure. Being in the background of everything, the "why" seldom gets mentioned. Certainly the "what" and "how" are more exciting, take more time from everyone's day, and get most of the headlines. But much of the struggle over them may but reflect the hidden differences over "why."

In the Iranian hostage crisis, no one asked why we wanted the Embassy staff members returned; everyone worried a lot about what to do and how to do it. When the Panama Canal treaties were up for Senate advice and consent, there was some confusion about why they were presented, but the apathetic majority seemed to win over the vocal minorities. In the Philippines very few contested President Reagan's reasons for dropping Marcos; yet sharp divisions exist over aid to the contras in Central America.

What and how will continue to claim most of our attention. More care in the choice of why could make the whole business of foreign policy run more smoothly.

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